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COURT OF APPEALS. 1955 TERM
of absence became effective, during which time petitioner was not under the
obligations of an active policeman, the Court held the dismissal to be unwarranted.
The Court pointed out that pension rights by their nature are compensation
for past services 3 and ought not be withheld without legal cause, and the immediate
leave of absence provision, enacted to protect policemen from last minute forfeitures, does not preclude the police department's conducting an investigation of
prior misconduct during the thirty day statutory waiting period. The waiting
period was enacted in 1951 to provide an opportunity to determine if there is any
prior conduct which warrants the denial of a pension and to prevent retirement
4
in the face of pending or expected charges, once possible under previous charters.
THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO provides that the pension board
shall retire any member upon his application who has completed twenty-five years
of actual service. 5 But no pension shall be granted to a member against whom any
charge of dereliction of duty has been preferred and remains undetermined, or to a
member charged with the commission of a crime.6 There is, however, no statutory
waiting period or provision for immediate leave of absence.

Unemployment Insurance
The Unemployment Insurance Law 7 was enacted for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own, and was not intended to confer benefits
on every person out of employment.8 Persons who do not fit within the prescribed
category are not barred completely from benefits but their rights are suspended
for certain periods. Thus the rights of strikers and other claimants involved in
"industrial controversy" are suspended for seven weeksP If employment is terminated voluntarily and without good cause, the claimant is barred for forty-two
days.' 0 The obvious problems involved in determining "voluntariness" and "good
cause" have been recognized and are under legislative consideration, but no solution
has been suggested.' The cases, however, present.the attempts of the courts to
discover a rational and workable view of the field.
3. Giannettino v. McGoldrick, 295 N. Y. 208, 66 N. E. 2d 57 (1946).
4. Pierne v. Valentine, 291 N. Y. 333, 52 N. E. 2d 57 (1946); Rogalin v. New
York City Teachers' Retirement Board, 290 N. Y. 664, 49 N. E. 2d 623 (1943);
People ex reZ Fitzpatrick v. Greene, 181 N. Y. 308, 78 N. E. 1111 (1905).
5. THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO §464 (1950).
6. Id §469.
7. N. Y. LABoR LAw §§ 500-643.
8. In re Waterman, 285 App. Div. 1106, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (3d Dep't 1955);
Claim of Palmieri,276 App. Div. 417, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (3d Dep't 1950).
9. N. Y. LABOR LAw §592.
10. N. Y. LABOR LAW §593.
11. Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment Insurance,
1955 N. Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 335.

BUFFALO LAIV REVIEIV
(1) If pursuant to a contract between the union and employer the plant
is shut down for vacations, even those employees without sufficient seniority to be
paid during this period are barred from unemployment benefits.12 The reason
advanced is that the employees have voluntarily temporarily taken themselves out
3
of the labor market. The will of the union is considered that of the employees.'
(2)
Where the claimant notified his employer that he would be quitting in
three weeks and was immediately discharged, he was deemed not to have voluntarily
terminated his employment. Claim of Baida.1 4 The termination was involuntary
even though for good cause. Such does not bar the rights of the employee to
unemployment benefits. 15
(3) The claimant was hired under a provision of limited membership
rights in the union, allowing such new employees to continue working for the
longer of sixty days or one voyage. Discharge of the employee pursuant to this
provision at the expiration of the period was held not necessarily for good cause.
Claim of Fiol.16 Whether the claimant was entitled to benefits depended upon
whether he left for good cause, which in turn depended upon whether the
regulation limiting the term of employment was justified; whether "the nature of
the industry, the state of the labor market, and other relevant considerations
furnished reasonable basis in fact for that regulation."' 7 Otherwise the union
could arbitrarily determine good cause by adopting any regulation it wished.
The court did not question the existence of voluntariness, apparently transferring
such to the claimant from the union.18
(4) In the recent case of In re Malaspina's Claim,19 the employee failed to
join the union within sixty days as required under the union shop provision in
the contract, and was accordingly discharged. His claim for benefits was denied.
The termination was held voluntary. His only reason for not joining-that he
couldn't afford the nominal initiation fee-was held to be unreasonable under the
circumstances and not good cause. The sixty day requirement is, of course,
within the test of Fiol, but Baida is distinguishable on the ground that no volun12. In re Graziandeis' Claim, 286 App. Div. 911, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (3d Dep't
1955); Naylor v. Schuron Optical Co., 281 App. Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S. 2d 775 (3d
Dep't 1953), aj'd, 306 N.Y. 794, 118 N.E. 2d 816 (1953); In re Mullen, 277 App. Dlv.
1073, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (3d Dep't 1950). This appears to be the majority view.
Annot. 30 A.L.R. 2d 366, 374 (1953).
13. Cases cited note 12 supra.
14. 282 App. Div. 975, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (3d Dep't 1953).
15. "An employee is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits upon his
discharge from employment, even though the discharge was for good cause or
otherwise provoked by the employee." Claim of Baida, supra note 14. But not If
the employee is guilty of misconduct. N. Y. LABOR LAW §592(2).
16. 305 N. Y. 264, 112 N.E. 2d 281 (1955).
17. Claim of Fiol, supra at 266, 112 N.E. 2d at 282.
18. See cases cited note 12.
19. 309 N.Y. 413, 131 N.E. 2d 790 (1956).
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tariness in claimant's having his employment terminated was involved there.
Discharge was not certain to result from his act. In the instant case it was
completely within the power of the claimant that he should or should not pay
his dues, and his voluntary choice of the latter necessarily meant that discharge
would follow.

Sovereign Immunity
In Glassman v. Glassman,20 plaintiff brought an action to set aside a conveyance made by a judgment-debtor to the New York State Employees Retirement
System,21 such conveyance rendering the judgment-debtor insolvent. The Court
held that even though the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the
state and its agencies, the doctrine will not be applied where, as here, the state or
governmental unit, although named as a defendant, is not an actual or interested
adverse party, and the suit is, therefore, not a suit against the state.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern times serves to protect the
state against interference with the performance of its governmental functions
and preserve its control over state funds, property and instrumentalities. 22 In
New York, the remedy whereby individuals with claims against the state may
seek redress has taken the form of a legislative waiver of the state's "immunity
24
from liability."23 Such suits must, however, be brought in the Court of Claims.
The New York State Employees Retirement System is "a state instrumentality
clothed with sovereign immunity."25 The immunity of a state agency is in no
way affected by the lack of any other remedy26 or by the fact that the agency is
27
endowed with the powers and privileges of a corporation.
The nature of the creditor's recovery in the instant case brought under
Section 273 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law is to levy upon such
property "which he is entitled to treat as belonging to the debtor, albeit the tide
is ostensibly lodged elsewhere." 28 The Retirement System is a party in the instant
20. 309 N.Y. 436, 131 N.E. 2d 721 (1955).
21. N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAw §50 et seq.
22. U. S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
23. N. Y. COURT OF CLAIMS AcT §8.
24. id.
25. Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436,438 131 N.E. 2d 721,724 (1955).
26. Psaty v. Duryea, 306 N.Y. 413,419,420, 118 N.E. 2d 584,587,588 (1954);
Buckles v. State of New York, 221 N.Y. 418, 423,424, 117 N.E. 811, 812,813 (1917).
27. Breen v. Mortgage Commission of State of New York, 285 N.Y. 425,430,
35 N.E. 2d 25,27 (1941).
28. Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139,142, 27 NI 2.
91_4,81. (1940).

